Volume 6
Issue 1 Winter
Fall 1976

Constitutional Problems of Civil Commitment Procedures in New
Mexico
Edeltraut Hanneman
Mary Anne McCourt

Recommended Citation
Edeltraut Hanneman & Mary Anne McCourt, Constitutional Problems of Civil Commitment Procedures in
New Mexico, 6 N.M. L. Rev. 113 (1976).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmlr/vol6/iss1/6

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by The University of New Mexico School of
Law. For more information, please visit the New Mexico Law Review website: www.lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr

NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF CIVIL
COMMITMENT PROCEDURES IN NEW MEXICO

The courts and the legal profession have only recently become
concerned with involuntary civil commitment procedures and the
rights of the mentally ill.1 In contrast to developments in criminal
law, where courts have enlarged the scope of procedural and constitutional protections for a defendant, due process safeguards for
persons facing civil commitment have been severely limited, considering the potential loss of freedom which commitment entails.
This article will discuss and analyze civil commitment procedures
in New Mexico with emphasis on substantive standards, procedural
requirements, and the hearing process itself. Potential constitutional
deficiencies and needed statutory change will be analyzed in light of
developing federal constitutional protection and rights of the
mentally ill.2 Relevant empirical data gathered over a seven-month
period in the District Court of Bernalillo County, New Mexico, will
also be presented.3 Furthermore, the need for counsel for the proTo avoid the sexist connotations implicit in the exclusive use of masculine pronouns
throughout this paper, we have deliberately alternated the use of "he" and "his" with "she"
and "her."
1. In convening a series of hearings on the constitutional rights of the mentally ill,
Subcommittee Chairman Sam Ervin commented:
Certainly the loss of freedom, of property, and of civil and personal rights
solely because of mental illness is a process which should disturb every
American concerned with the blessings of liberty. It is tempting to say that the.
problems of the mentally ill and their families are of no concern to the rest of
the population.
Hearings on the ConstitutionalRights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d. Sess., at 1
(1969-1970) [hereinafter Senate Hearings, 1970].
2. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 95 S.Ct. 2486 (1975); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504
(1972); In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); In Re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378
(M.D. Ala. 1974) (three-judge court); Bell v. Wayne County General Hospital, 384 F. Supp.
1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (three-judge court); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D.
Wis. 1972) (three-judge court); vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473,
reinstated 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated and remandedon other grounds, 421 U.S.
957 (1975); and Dixon v. Attorney General of Pennsylvania, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa.
1971) (three-judge court).
3. E. Hannemann, The Labeling Perspective and Commitment Procedures:A Case Study
of Bernalillo District Court in Albuquerque,New Mexico 38 (unpublished master's thesis in
University of New Mexico Library, 1974).
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posed patient and counsel's role in the commitment process will be
considered.
CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEDURES IN NEW MEXICO
InitiatingInvoluntary Commitment
New Mexico emergency and nonemergency involuntary civil
commitment are commenced by filing a written application with the
district court. Almost anyone involved with the allegedly mentally ill
person may file the application.4 The application for nonemergency

commitment must be accompanied by a certificate of a licensed
physician or osteopath attesting to having examined the individual
and concluding that the proposed patient is mentally ill and should

be involuntarily referred for mental health care.'

The court must

notify the proposed patient that an application has been filed and

appoint at least one physician to examine the patient and report the
findings. 6 If the physician finds mental illness, a hearing is held
before a special commissioner to determine if the proposed patient
should be committed. If the physician reports a finding of no mental
illness, the court must dismiss the application. 7
4. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-5 (Supp. 1975). Mental health care upon court order-Judicial
procedure.A. Proceedings for the involuntary referral of an individual by the court for mental
health care under this section may be commenced by the filing of a written application with
the district court by a friend, relative, spouse or guardian of the individual, or by a licensed
physician, a health of public welfare officer or the head of any public or private institution
in which such individual may be. Any such application shall be accompanied by a certificate
of a licensed physician that he has examined the individual and is of the opinion that he is
mentally ill and should be involuntarily referred for mental health care or a written statement by the applicant that the individual has refused to submit to an examination by a
licensed physician.
5. Id.
6. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-5B (Supp. 1975). Upon receipt of an application the court
shall give notice thereof to the proposed patient, to his legal guardian, if any, and to his
spouse, parents and nearest known other relative or friend.
C. As soon as practicable after notice of the commencement of proceedings is given, the
court shall appoint one (1) or more licensed physicians to examine the proposed patient and
report to the court his findings as to the mental condition of the proposed patient and his
need for custody, care or treatment in a mental hospital or mental health facility, or is in
need of any alternative course of mental health care.
7. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-SE (Supp. 1975). If the report or reports of the licensed
physician or physicians is or are to the effect that the proposed patient is not mentally ill,
the court may without taking any further action terminate the proceedings and dismiss the
application; otherwise, it shall forthwith fix a date for, and give notice of, a hearing to be
not less than five (5) nor more than fifteen (15) days from receipt of the report. However,
the minimum five-day period may be waived by the court with the consent of the proposed
patient's employed or appointed counsel and upon receipt of testimony or an affidavit from
the examining physician that immediate hearing is in the best interest, or for the welfare of
the proposed patient. If the report or reports of the licensed physician or physicians is to
the effect that the proposed patient is mentally ill and is likely to injure himself or others or
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The emergency commitment procedure also requires a written
application accompanied by a physician's certificate. This certification must include a medical opinion of mental illness and the likelihood of injury to self or others. The individual must be admitted
within three days after the medical examination.' The medical certification authorizes "any health or law enforcement officer to take
the individual into custody and transport him immediately to the
nearest hospital or mental health facility that has the approval of the

state department of public health as a suitable facility for the cus-

tody and care of such patients and which will admit the individual." 9
The patient must be released within 24 hours unless a member of the

hospital staff agrees that the person is dangerous to self or to
others.'

0

And the patient must be released after five days unless the

is in need of custody, care or treatment, the court, in any community that has a community
mental health center or a similar facility, shall proceed as follows: the court shall then refer
the proposed patient for examination by the community mental health center and for a
report therefrom to the court on the appropriateness of community based care for the
patient.
F. The proposed patient, the applicant and all other persons to whom notice is required
to be given shall be afforded an opportunity to appear at the hearing, to testify and to
present and cross examine witnesses, and the court may in its discretion receive the testimony of any other person. The proposed patient shall not be required to be present, and all
persons not necessary for the conduct of the proceedings shall be excluded, except as the
court may admit persons having a legitimate interest in the proceedings. The hearings shall
be conducted in as informal a manner as may be consistent with the orderly procedure and
in a physical setting not likely to have a harmful effect on the mental health of the proposed
patient. The court shall receive all relevant and material evidence which may be offered and
shall not be bound by the rules of evidence. An opportunity to be represented by counsel
shall be afforded to every proposed patient, and if neither he nor others provide counsel, the
court shall appoint counsel.
8. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-18 (Supp. 1975). Involuntary referral for mental health care
on medical certification-Emergency procedure-Detention pending judicial determination.-A. The superintendent or admitting physician of a hospital or mental health facility
may admit an individual upon:
(1) the sworn application, signed by any health or law enforcement officer,
officer of any charitable institution, legal guardian, spouse or relative stating
his belief that the individual appears to be mentally ill and because of his
illness is likely to cause injury to himself or others if not immediately taken
into appropriate custody, the grounds for such belief, and the names and
addresses of the individual's legal guardian, spouse or nearest relative, if
known; and
(2) a certification by at least one (1) licensed physician that he has
examined the individual and is of the opinion that the individual is mentally ill
and, because of his illness, is likely to injure himself or others if not immediately taken into appropriate custody. An individual with respect to which
such a certificate has been issued may not be admitted on the basis thereof at
any time after expiration of three (3) days after the date of examination by
the licensed physician.
9. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-18A(2), B (Supp. 1975).
10. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-18C (Supp. 1975). Whenever a patient has been admitted
pursuant to this section, he shall be examined by a physician on the staff of the hospital or
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hospital or mental health facility has initiated court proceedings.''
Methods of Appeal and PeriodicReview

Under the New Mexico statute, any court-committed patient is
entitled to have the civil commitment order reexamined by the committing court on petition.' 2 And the court must unconditionally
release a person found to have been erroneously committed. Other

avenues of potential relief are available to a person institutionalized
against his or her will. The patient has a right to a hearing six months

after commitment and once every year thereafter.' ' The 1patient
4
may also apply for a writ of habeas corpus at any time.

The

statute also provides for an automatic medical review every six
months.' "

If the medical examination shows that the involuntarily

committed patient is no longer in need of hospitalization, he must be
discharged.'

6

mental health facility as soon as practicable and in all events within twenty-four (24) hours
after admission.
D. After being examined by a staff physician the patient shall be released immediately
unless the examining physician finds and certifies that based on his examination he believes
the individual is suffering from a mental illness and that he is likely to injure himself or
others because of such illness unless provided with appropriate care and custody. Such
certification, along with the application and certification for admission shall be maintained
with the permanent records of the hospital or mental health facility.
11. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-18F (Supp. 1975). Every patient involuntarily referred for
mental health care under this section shall be released from the hospital or mental health
facility within five (5) days after his admission unless the superintendent of the hospital or
mental health facility commences or causes to be commenced proceedings for judicial
determination pursuant to § 34-2-5 NMSA 1953.
12. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-12 (Supp. 1975). Petition for re-examination of order of
involuntarily referral for mental health care.-Any patient involuntarily referred for mental
health care pursuant to section 5 (34-2-5) shall be entitled to a re-examination of the order
for his involuntary referral for mental health care on his own petition, or that of his legal
guardian, parent, spouse, relative, or friend, to the district court of the county in which he
resides or is detained. Upon receipt of the petition the court shall conduct or cause to be
conducted by a special commissioner proceedings in accordance with such section 5 (34-2-5)
except that such proceeding shall not be required to be conducted if the petition is filed
sooner than six (6) months after the issuance of the order of involuntary referral for mental
health care or sooner than one (1) year after the filing of a previous petition under this
section.
13. Id.
14. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-16 (Comp. 1953). Writ of habeas corpus.-Any individual
detained pursuant to this act [34-2-1 to 34-2-25] shall be entitled to the writ of habeas
corpus upon proper petition by himself or a friend to any court generally empowered to
issue the writ of habeas corpus in the county in which he is detained.
15. The six-month automatic medical review is sometimes shortened to 90 days after
hospitalization; as observed at three civil commitment hearings conducted by a special
commissioner at the Bernalillo County Mental Health Center, Albuquerque, New Mexico,
Sept. 17, 1975.
16. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-10 (Comp. 1953). Discharge.-The head of a hospital shall as
frequently as practicable, but not less often than every six (6) months, examine or cause to
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COMMITMENT STANDARDS
The New Mexico statutes require proof that the proposed patient
is mentally ill and is either likely to injure self or others or is in need
of custody, care or treatment.' 7 In all cases New Mexico also requires a showing of the individual's incapacity "to make responsible
decisions with respect to his custody, care or treatment."' 8 Once
these standards have been met, the court may order hospitalization
or involuntary referral to a mental health facility for an indeterminate period or for a temporary observational period not exceeding
six months, or order an alternative course of treatment in the best
interests of the person.' 9
The New Mexico statute does not indicate the rationale underlying
its commitment standards.2 0 But the state's authority to commit
derives either from its role as parens patriae or from its police power.
Subsection 2(a) of the statute, which requires a likelihood of dangerousness to others, is founded upon the police power of the state. The
state has a legitimate interest in protecting its citizens against threats
to their persons or property. 2' Where the state's power flows from a
finding that an individual is dangerous to self or is in need of care or
treatment, that power derives from the parens patriae function of the
state rather than from the police power. When a mentally ill individual lacks the capacity to make treatment decisions, the state may
properly use its parens patriae power to compel commitment for the
best interests of the person.2 2 However, in New Mexico a commitbe examined every patient and whenever he determines that the conditions justifying involuntary hospitalization no longer obtain, discharge the patient.
17. N.M. Stat Ann. § 34-2-5G (Supp. 1975). If, upon completion of the hearing and
consideration of the record, the court finds that the proposed patient:
(1) is mentally ill;
and
(2) (a) because of his illness is likely to injure himself or others if allowed
to remain at liberty; or
(b) is in need of custody, care or treatment in a mental hospital or
mental health facility, or is in need of any alternative course of mental health
care; and
(3) because of his illness, lacks sufficient insight or capacity to make responsible decisions with respect to his custody, care or treatment, it may order
his involuntary referral to a hospital or a mental health facility or to the
custody of the hospitals and institutions department for an indeterminate
period, or for a temporary observational period not exceeding six (6) months;
or order any alternative course of treatment which the court believes will be in
the best interests of the person and the public; otherwise it shall dismiss the
proceedings.
18. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-5G(3) (Supp. 1975).
19. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-5G (Supp. 1975).
20. Id.
21. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1905).
22. See Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill 87 Harv. L.
Rev. 1190, 1212-22 (1974) [hereinafterDevelopments in the Law].
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ment predicated upon a finding of dangerousness must also rest upon
a finding that the person lacks "sufficient insight or capacity to make
responsible decisions with respect to his custody, care or treatment." 2 3 The New Mexico statute requires a finding of incapacity
both for a police power commitment (dangerousness to others) and
for a parens patriae commitment (dangerousness to self and need for
care or treatment). This showing generally comports with substantive
due process because it requires not only that the state have a valid
objective, but also that the proposed patient be incapable of making
the decisions alone.' ' The state's power to decide flows, in part,
from the individuals' inability to do so.
The state's police power may'justify confinement of persons
found guilty of the commission of a crime, but it does not permit ihe
2S
state to confine persons for potential future criminal conduct.
However, the New Mexico statute permits the mentally ill to be
confined because of their potential for antisocial behavior, not for
harm already caused. The equal protection clause demands that there
be a substantial state interest to justify treating the mentally ill person who is potentially dangerous, differently from a sane person
similarly predisposed. 2 6
Preventive detention of the mentally ill because of their dangerousness can only be justified by a statute which clearly defines the
term so that the mentally ill person knows what constitutes "dangerousness" just as the criminal defendant must have notice of what acts
are forbidden by a statute. Dangerousness must also be clearly
defined to provide governmental authorities and the courts with
appropriate standards for enforcing the law.2 7
The United States Supreme Court discussed the concept of dangerousness as a standard for civil commitment in O'Connor v. Donaldson. 2 ' The Court held that a state cannot constitutionally confine a
nondangerous mentally ill individual if he is capable of surviving
safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing family members or friends.2 9 The Court held that the state had not established a
constitutionally adequate purpose for the confinement. 3 Confinement of a nondangerous mentally ill person who can be cared for by
23. N.M. Stat Ann. § 34-2-5G(3) (Supp. 1975).
24. See Developments in the Law, supra note 22, at 1210-28; see also Postel, Civil
Commitment: A FunctionalAnalysis,38 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1, 28-37 (1971).
25. See Developments in the Law, supra note 22, at 1228.
26. Id. at 1210, 1215-16 & n. 83.
27. Id. at 1253.
28. 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975).
29. Id. at 2494.
30. Id. at 2492-94.
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family or friends is justified neither by the state's parens patriae
power nor by its police power.
However, the constitutional issue in Donaldson was narrowly
drawn by the Court. The Court admitted that it did not have to
decide the issue of
...when or by what procedures, a mentally ill person may be confined by the State on any of the grounds which, under contemporary statutes, are generally advanced to justify involuntary
confinement of such a person-to prevent injury to the public, to

ensure his own survival or safety, or to alleviate or cure his illness.3 I
Thus, the Supreme Court has yet to consider whether commitment
standards requiring only a showing of general "dangerousness" might
deprive the proposed patient of his liberty without due process
because they are too vague to ensure that individuals will not be
committed except in furtherance of valid state objectives. 3 2
The New Mexico statutory standard of likelihood of injury to self
or to others is subject to different interpretations. The statute does
not require proof that the likelihood of injury to self or others is
substantial or is based upon a recent overt act of the individual. By
contrast, the federal court in evaluating the Wisconsin civil commitment statute Lessard v. Schmidt held that substantive due process
requires proof of a "recent overt act, attempt or threat to do substantial harm to oneself or another"'3 to validate a commitment for
dangerousness.
The court in Lessard also held that the Wisconsin civil commitment statute could withstand a constitutional challenge for vagueness
only if construed to require a showing of "an extreme likelihood that
if the person is not confined he will do immediate harm to himself or
others." 3 4 Similarly, the federal court in Lynch v. Baxley, a case
challenging Alabama civil commitment procedures, required a "real
and present threat of substantial harm to himself or to others."'3
Dangerousness is usually proven by expert testimony of a physician. Doctors asked whether a proposed patient is dangerous to self
or to others invariably answer in the affirmative. 3 6 The New Mexico
statute, like most others, does not specify what magnitude of prob31. Id. at 2493.
32. See Developments in the Law, supra note 22, at 1253 & n. 278. A major Supreme
Court case defining the void-for-vagueness doctrine is Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
405 U.S. 156 (1972).
33. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (three-judge court).
34. Id. The Lessard court cited Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095, 1102 (1969) for this
standard of dangerousness.
35. 386 F. Supp. 378, 390 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (three-judge court).
36. E. Hannemann, supra note 3, at 38.
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able danger or injury must be found or the required likelihood of its
occurrence. The testifying physician or psychiatrist is thus left to
interpret and predict the amount and degree of danger as he alone
deems fit. An American Civil Liberties Union study found that
psychiatrists or psychologists agree on the prediction of dangerous3
ness only 54 percent of the time. 3 Another study " revealed that
judges and juries estimated the potential for dangerous behavior
better than hospital staff. But the essential point is not who is more
correct in predicting dangerous behavior, but that commitment
statutes do not unambiguously specify what constitutes dangerous
behavior. The paradox is that "85 percent of all convicted criminals
will commit additional crimes after they are discharged from prison.
...(B)ut ...

we let them go." 3 9 On the other hand, the mentally ill

may be deprived of their liberty on the basis of predictions of future
behavior. Not only expert witnesses view the mentally ill as dangerous:
•. laymen frequently seem to erroneously view the institutionalized
mentally ill as almost universally homicidal or suicidal. The figures
do not support this position. Whether the mentally ill are allowed to
remain in the community or whether they are institutionalized
would seem to have no significant effect on the overall rate of
40
violent crime or suicide.

Research shows that mental patients are, on the whole, less dangerous than the general population.4 1 Psychiatrists grossly overpredict 4 2 dangerousness, ascribing an element of danger to most
mental patients.
37. B. Ennis & L. Siegel, The Rights of Mental Patients, The Basic ACLU Guide to a
Mental Patient's Rights .286 (1973).
38. J. Rappeport, The Clinical Evaluation of the Dangerousness of the Mentally Ill 4
(1967).
39. B. Ennis & L. Siegel, supra note 37, at 23.
40. Testimony of Morton Birnbaum, Senate Hearings,1970, supra note 1, at 639.
41. "Where individuals have been released despite psychiatric findings of dangerousness
or inability to get along in the community, the error rate has been shown from 44% to
95%." J. Ziskin, Coping with Psychiatric and Psychological Testimony, 364-365 (1970).
See Senate Hearings, 1970, supra note 1, at 265. See also Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S.
107 (1966) which results in the transfer of 1000 mentally in ex-convicts from a high-security hospital to a civil mental hospital and in the release of some patients, all of whom had
been predicted to be extremely dangerous. Fear, which later proved unfounded, was expressed for the safety of the community. The psychiatric predictions were almost totally
incorrect. "After one year the Department of Mental Hygiene reported that 'there have been
no significant problems with the patients ... over 200 have been released, and only seven
have been certified as too dangerous for a civil hospital'...
...out of 1000 predictions, the psychiatrists were right only seven times." B. Ennis & L.
Siegel, supra note 22, at 1230, note 157 for a slightly different conclusion.
42. Dershowitz, On Preventive Detention, The New York Review of Books, 22-27 (Mar.
13, 1969); Dershowitz, The Psychiatrist'sPower in Civil Commitment: A Knife That Cuts
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The United States Supreme Court, in Humphrey v. Cady, 4 3
adopted a balancing test between a patient's potential for doing harm
and the curtailment of his liberty. 4 4 To correct the subjectivity in
making a prediction of dangerous behavior, the New Mexico civil
commitment statutes should clearly define "dangerous behavior" by
adopting standards similar to those imposed in Lessard and Lynch.
Because the deprivation of liberty which commitment entails is great,
both the magnitude of the probable harm and the likelihood of its
occurring must be substantial.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND CIVIL COMMITMENT
The United States Supreme Court has developed a two-tiered
approach to determining the procedural demands the due process
clause imposes upon government actions against individuals. The first
inquiry is whether the individual's interest which is affected by
government action is "liberty" or "property" within the meaning of
the clause. 4 s If it is, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require
that procedural safeguards suitable to protect individual interests
without doing violence to governmental objectives be employed. The
court must weigh the importance of individual interests affected
against the governmental interest in avoiding the expense and inconvenience which more stringent procedures will entail.4 6 The nature
of the interests affected and of the dispute itself determine the kind
of process which is due. Determining whether due process demands
apply to civil commitment procedures depends on whether the
involuntary hospitalization of the mentally ill is a deprivation of
liberty. Deprivation of liberty can result from physical confinement
in a mental health facility, or from other consequences, which may
include the loss of numerous civil rights.4
Both Ways, 2 Psychology Today 43-47 (Feb. 1969); Senate Hearings, 1970, supra note
41,
at 639.
43. 403 U.S. 504 (1972).
44. Id. at 509.
45. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 481-83 (1972); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1 9 72); See
also
Note, Procedural Due Process in Government.Subsidized Housing, 86 Harv. L. Rev.
880,
887-93 (1973).
46. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-90 (1972); Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401-07 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-71 (1970).
47. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1088-90 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (three-judge
court). The Lessard court was particularly influenced by the loss of civil rights under
Wisconsin laws. In Wisconsin, a committed mental patient cannot vote, cannot make
contracts, cannot drive a car and cannot be married. Id. at 1088-89. New Mexico statutes
do
not prevent the exercise of civil rights by a committed mental patient unless such person
is
adjudicated an incompetent and has not been restored to legal capacity. Incompetency
is
determined by a different judicial proceeding than is civil commitment. See N.M. Stat.
Ann.
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Another factor contributes to the deprivation suffered by the
involuntarily committed: the individual's stigmatization as mentally
ill. The Lessard court noted the disabilities often suffered by an
4
individual after his release from a mental institution. " Upon release
the patient may suffer psychological pressures because of difficulties
in readjusting to the outside world. There may also be serious side
effects of institutionalization imposed upon persons who did not

initially need treatment.'

9

Third, a stigma may attach to those

involuntarily committed, which rivals or even surpasses in severity
that which attaches to those labeled criminal. Laymen often consider
mental illness opprobrious, both more serious and threatening than
physical disease.' 0
As a result of civil commitment hearings, proposed mental patients
are medically and legally labeled by the state mentally ill. The term
"mental illness" is general, ambiguous, and arbitrary, but a powerful
social label and a stigma.' 1 The power and persistence of the label
was demonstrated in an experiment conducted recently by Dr. D. L.
Rosenhan. s 2 Eight pseudo-patients were admitted to different
mental hospitals on the East and West coasts. They gained admission
by pretending to "hear voices," then ceased simulating any symp-

toms of abnormality upon admission. Seven of these "sane, normal"

persons were labeled "schizophrenic" in state hospitals, and one was
labeled "manic-depressive" in a private hospital. Rosenhan, a psychi§ 32-2-1 to 32-2-10 and N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-15 (Supp. 1975). The person adjudged
incompetent loses his right to dispose of property, to execute contracts, to make purchases,
to enter contractual relationships, and to vote. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-15A(3) (Supp.
1975).
48. 349 F. Supp. at 1089.
49. See In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
50. See E. Goffman, Asylums 355-56 (1962):
In response to his stigmatization and to he sensed deprivation that occurs
when he enters the hospital, the inmate frequently develops some alienation
from civil society. . . . This alienation can develop regardless of the type of
disorder for which the patient was committed, constituting a side effect of
hospitalization that frequently has more significance for the patient and his
personal circle than do his original difficulties.
See also In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 665 note 56 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
51. The label mental illness is also considered to be a stigma. One commentator, noting
that "former mental patients do not get jobs," has insisted that in "the job market, it is
better to be an ex-felon than ex-patient." Testimony of Bruce J. Ennis, American Civil
Liberties Union, New York, at Senate Hearings, 1970, supra note 1, at 284. This statement
is also quoted in the Lessard case, 349 F. Supp. at 1089.
One critic, who is both a lawyer and a psychiatrist, states: "I might add that I have
ruefully discovered that the cure is often worse than the disease, that families are disrupted,
jobs are lost, lives are ruined, and ... the stigma of mental illness has consequences far
beyond anything which those of us in this room would really like to consider." Testimony
of Dr. Kaufman, Senate Hearings, 1970, supra note 1, at 304.
52. Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 Science 250-59 (1973).
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atrist and himself a participant in the experiment, pointed out that
"once a person is designated abnormal, all of his other
behaviors and
characteristics are colored by that label. Indeed, that label is so
powerful that many of the pseudo-patients' normal behaviors were
overlooked entirely or profoundly misinterpreted." ' ' As this study
indicates, the psychiatric label has a life and an influence of its own,
and the label endures beyond discharge. 4
The American Psychiatric Association has pointed out that
.. . psychiatrists know full well that irrational factors belie [the
diagnosis'] validity and that labels of themselves condition our perception."' ' Nevertheless, in commitment hearings the participants
specifically request that the testifying psychiatrist attach a general
label, mental illness, and a specific diagnosis, e.g., schizophrenia,
manic-depressive, to the proposed patient.5 6
Proposed patients who are labeled mentally ill are often stigmatized socially and professionally.'7 Thomas Szasz, discussing the
term stigma and its discrediting attributes, has said that ". . . being
considered or labeled mentally disordered-abnormal, crazy, mad,
psychotic, sick-is the most profoundly discrediting classification
that can be imposed on a person today." ' 8
Most patients in American mental institutions are committed
involuntarily. One may ask, who determines whether an individual is,
or is not, to be committed? Szasz's answer is that institutional
psychiatry has unchecked power to make this decision.5 9 This
unchecked power is wielded in civil commitment hearings, where
courts place psychiatric witnesses outside usual legal controls. The
decision to label a person insane or sane often rests solely with the
expert witness, whose subjective standards decide who is to be
53. Id. at 251.
54. Release for the ex-mental patient is still a traumatic experience, for ... nothing has
happened to cancel out the stigmas imposed upon him by earlier commitment ceremonies:
the original verdict or diagnosis is still formally in effect." Erikson, Notes on the Sociology
of Deviance, 9 Social Problems 312 (1962).
55. Committee on Nomenclature and Statistics, Am. Psychiatric Ass'n Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders viii (1968).
56. "... . the criteria and norms used in defining 'mental disease' are neither specific nor
objective, nor are they separate from a multitude of ethical and social considerations
inhereint in the labeling process." Testimony of Saleem A. Shah, Senate Hearings, 1970,
supra note 1, at 584.
57. Note that in July, 1972, Senator Thomas Eagleton was forced to resign from the vice
presidential race in part, at least, because of his history as a mental patient. See also In re
Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 668 n. 72 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
58. T. Szasz, The Manufacturing of Madness 62 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Szasz]. Cf
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1953).
59. T. Szasz, supra Note 58.
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labeled mentally ill.6 0 Testifying psychiatrists are the agents of private lawyers or district attorneys who, not trained in medicine or
psychiatry, accept the subjective, unscientific labeling process and
use it as evidence to support commitment.
Jerome J.
Commission
psychiatrists
patient, and

Shestack, chairman of the American Bar Association
on the Mentally Disabled, has noted that testifying
often play two roles: the traditional one of doctor to
that of technician requested by the employing institu-

tion or the state to make an objective evaluation for legal purposes;
and
Deprivation of a person's liberty or status without due process has
long been the law's concern, particularly when the depriving institution is an ann of the state. The dangers that may arise from the
psychiatrist's conflict of roles are precisely dangers to human freethe role conflict is an
dom. Hence, it can hardly be denied that
61
appropriate one for the law's intervention.

The difficulty of the psychiatrist's discharging such inconsistent
duties is compounded by the inherently unreliable nature of the
62
prediction he is asked to make. The most common findings
indicate that psychiatrists agree upon diagnoses no more than 60
percent of the time. The resulting danger of erroneous deprivation of
individual liberty dictates the need for stringent procedural safeguards.
The court must also consider the objectives of the state in civil
commitment process. The court must recognize the state's concern
6
for efficient and economic allocation of its resources. ' However,
60.

"The following ideas have been presented to the committee: the conviction
that most people currently labeled mentally ill are not ill at all, but show
learned behavior patterns that are deviant and usually maladaptive; ... that
...[they] ... can learn 'crazy' behavioral responses to various situations ..
if the 'crazy' responses should happen to be reinforced; that the term 'mental
illness' relieves the individual of responsibility for his behavior and creates
unrealistic expectations of cure from an external source...
Senate Hearings, 1970, supra note 1, at 570.
61. Shestack, Psychiatry and the Dilemmas of Dual Loyalties, 60 A.B.A. J. 1521, 1523
(1974).
62. Several research studies indicate reliability of diagnosis between two psychiatrists
from as high as 60 percent, to 54 percent, and as low as 42 percent supra note 41, at
181-83. See the following studies in J. Ziskin: Ash, The Reliability of PsychiatricDiagnosis,
44 J. Abnormal Social Psychology 272 (1949); V. Norris, Mental Illness in London
(Maudsley Monograph 1959); Spitzer, Cohen, et. al., Quantification of Agreement in Psychiatric Diagnosis, 17 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 83 (1967); Beck, Wane, et. al, Reliability of
PsychiatricDiagnoses: A Study of Consistency of Clinical Judgmentsand Ratings, 11 Am. J.
Psychiatry 351 (1962).
63. See Developments in the Law, supra note 22, at 1272.
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the most significant goals of the state are the substantive objectives
defined by the statutory standards for commitment. The state has a
valid interest in preventing those changes in procedure which will
thwart the substantive objectives of the statute.
Commitment standards authorize involuntary hospitalization by
the state under the police power and the parens patriae power. It is
necessary to distinguish between these two kinds of commitments in
order to understand the state's argument for relaxed procedural protections. 6 4
The state has an interest in confining those persons who are dangerous to others under its police power. 6 This substantive objective
is impaired by procedural safeguards which might increase the margin
of error that a dangerous person will go free. Recognition of the right
to remain silent or a higher burden of proof might have this effect.
However, the state's interests would not be impeded by procedures
which increase the accuracy of the factfinding process, such as an
indigent's right to an independent psychiatric examination at state
expense.
In parens patriae commitments the state can offer other reasons
for relaxed procedures. Under this power, a person who lacks sufficient capacity or insight to determine whether he needs care and
treatment may be confined if the courts finds the benefits of hospitalization outweigh the deprivations of commitment. 6 6 The state can
justify an informal procedure because its motives are benevolent, not
punitive, and because a formal adversary setting might traumatize the
proposed patient.6 7
Traditionally, courts have refused to apply stringent due process
safeguards to civil commitment proceedings on the grounds that civil
commitment procedures are civil, not criminal in nature. 6 8 Therefore, the argument goes, procedural requirements due criminal
defendants are not mandated, even though civil commitment in64. See In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 656-60 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court held that in
police power commitments, based upon the dangerousness of the proposed patient, stringent due process safeguards should be applied as in criminal prosecutions but that in parens
patriae commitments, based upon a person's danger to himself, relaxed procedures may be
justified in some circumstances to avoid interference with the individual's care and treatment. Id. at 658-59.
65. See Developments in the Law, supra note 22, at 1223-45.
66. Id. at 1212-22. Who bears the cost of mistakes under the parens patriae model?
Those who need treatment but who are not committed ("undercommitted") and those who
do not need treatment but are committed ("overcommitted"). See Comment, The Role of
Counsel in the Civil Commitment Process: A Theoretical Framework, 84 Yale L.J. 1540,
1553 (1975).
67. Developments in the Law, supra note 22, at 1273 n. 60.
68. See Postel, supra note 24; Project: Facts and Fallaciesabout Iowa Civil Commitment,
55 Iowa L. Rev. 895 (1970).
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cludes the possibility of abridgement of personal freedom, just as
does imprisonment for the commission of a crime.
Another argument used to oppose application of due process safeguards to involuntary civil commitment contends that because the
alleged mentally ill person will receive needed treatment, lack of
6
This contention that the state's
procedural safeguards is excused.
commitment with relaxed
justifies
use of its parens patriae power
7
Similarly, recent
rejected.
been
procedural standards has recently
validity of the
the
upon
doubt
federal court decisions have cast
7 2 declared Wiscon7
Schmidt
Lessard v.
civil/criminal distinction.
sin's commitment procedure unconstitutional, rejecting both of the
foregoing arguments. The court held that the magnitude of the
individual interests affected by involuntary civil commitment
mandate "strict adherence to stringent procedural requirements and
7 The court found that
the necessity for narrow, precise standards."
the possibility of involuntary confinement, whether for the commis-

74
demands
sion of a crime or for treatment as a mental incompetent,
relied
court
The
stringent.
be
that procedural due process protection
safeguards
process
due
applying
in part on Supreme Court decisions
7
to juvenile court proceedings " which, like civil commitment proceedings, have the ostensible goal of helping, not punishing, the subject of the proceedings.
76
in rejecting
The Lessard court relied on Kent v. United States

the argument that right to treatment justifies lack of procedural due
process. The court noted that an individual institutionalized in a
mental hospital may not receive the beneficial care necessary to

compensate for the loss of liberty and that several mental illnesses
remain untreatable.'

7

Thus, the Lessard court concluded, "no per-

69. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1086-87 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (three-judge
court); Note, Lessard v. Schmidt: Due Process and Involuntary Civil Commitment, 68 Nw.
U.L. Rev. 585, 593 n. 30 (1973).
70. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1086-87 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (three-judge
court).
71. Id. at 1088; Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968).
72. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (three-judge court).
73. Id. at 1088.
74. Id. at 1086-90.
75. Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541 (1966); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Similarly, the
New Mexico Supreme Court in Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716 (1968), held
that juveniles are entitled to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.
76. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
77. 349 F. Supp. at 1087. See Livermore, On the Justificationsfor Civil Commitment,
117 Pa. L. Rev. 75, 93 (1966) (quoting psychiatric finding that recovery rates from long
term paranoid schizophrenia are very low, and substantial evidence that any lengthy hospitalization, particularly where it is involuntary, may greatly increase the symptoms of
mental illness and make adjustment to society more difficult). See also, Senate Hearings,
1970, supra note 1, at 214-15, 319, 409.
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son should be subjected to 'treatment' against his will" unless procedural due process requirements have been met. 78
The Supreme Court of New Mexico in State v. Sanchez"9 held
that due process was afforded a proposed patient who only had
notice and an opportunity to defend. However, many courts have
since imposed more stringent procedural requirements and more
narrow and precise standards.8 " The New Mexico Supreme Court's
willingness to require a more precise standard of proof for civil
commitment in State v. Valdez and Garcia," 1 may indicate a willingness to re-evaluate the procedures by which New Mexico permits
commitment of the allegedly mentally ill.
Assuming that due process safeguards are required in involuntary
civil commitment procedures, what procedures does due process
require? This question will be explored in two contexts-nonemergency civil commitment pursuant to § 34-2-5 of the New Mexico
statutes and emergency commitment pursuant to § 34-2-18 of the
New Mexico statutes.
Right to Notice
The United States Supreme Court has considered notice as essential to procedural regularity as the hearing itself.' 2 This right to
notice is founded in the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. The
Supreme Court stated in a landmark case involving the right to
notice:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in
any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
calculated,, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties
of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections.8
More specifically, effective notice must be both timely and explan78. 349 F. Supp. at 1087. See also the invalidation of state commitment statutes
due
process grounds in Bell v. Wayne County General Hospital, 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D.onMich.
1974) (three-judge court), and Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (threejudge court).
79. 80 N.M. 438, 457 P.2d 370 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 276 (1970). For
a
critical analysis of the holding in State v. Sanchez, see Developments in the Law, supra note
22, at 1247-48; also see Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill:
PracticalGuidesand ConstitutionalImperatives, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 1108, 1141-42 (1972).
80. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1088 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (three-judge
court).
81. 88 N.M. 338, 540 P.2d 818 (1975).
82. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
83. Id.

128
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atory:8 4 it must provide enough time and convey enough information to allow the recipient to respond effectively.' s Adequate notice
preceding a hearing must be given all persons with substantial interests which the state seeks to affect. Welfare recipients must be given
notice of the reasons for proposed termination of welfare payments. 8 6 Prior to a preliminary hearing on probable cause for parole
revocation, alleged parole violators must be notified of their alleged

notice of
misconduct. 8 7 Minors and their parents must be given
8

charges relating to juvenile delinquency proceedings . 8 As in criminal prosecutions, 8 9 due process requires that persons subject to civil
commitment procedures be given adequate notice of charges against

them so that they may have sufficient time to prepare their defense.9 o

The New Mexico statute does not require notice of hearings to
determine whether nonemergency involuntary commitment will be
9 2 the New Mexico Supreme Court
ordered. 9 ' In State v. Sanchez
held that notice of the nonemergency commitment hearing was
required both by the statute and by due process, but the Court did
not mention what the notice must include.
Some disagreement between members of the medical and legal
professions exists regarding the requirements of notice. Doctors
object to the requirement because service of papers upon an alleged
84. InIn re Gault, the Court said:
Notice, to comply with due process requirements, must be given sufficiently in
advance of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to
prepare will be afforded, and it must "set forth the alleged misconduct with
particularity."
387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967).
85. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), the Court
stated:
But when notice is a person's due, process which is a mere gesture is not due
process. The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The reasonableness
and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method may be defended
on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those
affected....
Id. at 315. Quarae: what is "reasonable" in the context of civil commitment proceedings?
86. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970).
87. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486-87, 489 (1972). The notice prior to preliminary hearing must include specific references to the alleged parole violations cited as
grounds for parole revocation. Id. at 487.
88. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31-3 (1967).
89. See, e.g., Garfield v. United States ex rel. Goldsby, 211 U.S. 249 (1908); Holden v.
Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
90. See, e.g., Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427, 436 (1901); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.
Supp. 1078, 1091-92 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (three-judge court).
91. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-5B; § 34-2-18 (Supp. 1975).
92. 80 N.M. 438, 457 P.2d 370 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 276 (1970).
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mentally ill person might aggravate her mental state.9 Legal commentators reject this view because it presupposes insanity, 9 ' the very
matter sought to be established by the commitment process.
Under the due process requirements delineated in Lessard, notice
must be given regardless of the circumstances because of the potential for serious deprivation of liberty. 9" Following Lessard, the
federal court in Bell v. Wayne County General Hospital,9 6 held that
the Michigan statute failed to provide due process because it did not
require that notice, including a copy of the petition itself, be served
on the patient prior to the hearing to allow adequate preparation. 9 7
The Bell court reasoned that due process requires the same kind of
notice as that required in juvenile criminal proceedings. 9 8
The New Mexico statute says that "upon receipt of an application
the court shall give notice thereof to the proposed patient. .

. ."'

9 It

does not require that the actual application for commitment be
delivered to any person or that the notice include the grounds for the
proposed commitment and the factual basis for the application. In all
other civil and criminal actions the defendant is made aware of the
nature of the allegations against him. The criminal defendant receives
at his arraignment a copy of the indictment or information. The civil
defendant receives a copy of the complaint setting out the plaintiff's
allegations when served with summons.
In Lynch v. Baxley' " the court set explicit due process standards
for notice to the proposed patient: notice must include the date,
time and place of the hearing; a clear statement of the purpose of the
proceedings and the potential consequences involved; the alleged
facts.upon which the proposed commitment is based; and a state93. Developments in the Law, supra note 22, at 1274-75.
94. Weihofen, Hospitalizingthe Mentally Ill, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 837, 844 (1952).
95. 349 F. Supp. at 1092.
96. 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (three-judge court).
97. Id. at 1092.
98. Id.
99. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-5B (Supp. 1975). State ex rel. Hawksv. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d
109 (W. Va. 1974), held that the notice provisions of the West Virginia civil commitment
statute were unconstitutional as applied. The statutory requirement of West Virginia is
almost identical to that of New Mexico. W. Va. Code 27-5-4(b) (Supp. 1975), as amended
provides: "Upon receipt of an application, the clerk shall give notice thereof to the individual .. " In Hawks, the court said:
Notice contemplates meaningful notice which affords an opportunity to prepare a defense and to be heard upon the merits. Therefore, any notice given to
advise a person that commitment proceedings are being brought against him
must contain a detailed statement of the grounds upon which the commitment
is sought, as well as the underlying facts which support the applicant's conclusion that the individual should be committed.
202 S.E.2d 109,124 (W. Va. 1974).
100. 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (three-judge court).
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ment of the legal standard upon which such commitment is authorized. 1 1
The New Mexico statute should set out more specific requirements
for notice to the prospective patient. Such notice should include the
purpose, time and place of the hearing, and should include a copy of
the application for commitment. Notice should come sufficiently in
advance of the hearing to permit preparation of an adequate defense.
Notice should also be given of the statutory basis for the proceeding,
the right to counsel, and the factual basis for allegations of mental
illness and dangerousness to self or others. Lack of full notice renders
the opportunity to be heard meaningless because the respondent in
the civil commitment action is disabled from presenting a wellreasoned and convincing case on his behalf. Thus, the process of
applying substantive law to facts through the adversary proceeding is
subverted because the proposed patient cannot present an argument
equal in weight to that of the state.
Right to Preliminary and Full Hearings
The right to an opportunity to be heard following notice is fundamental under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments."2 Due
process tolerates variances in the form of a hearing "appropriate to
the nature of the case,"' 0 3 and "depending upon the importance of
the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings
[if any] . 04
The threat to individual interests in "liberty" at stake in civil
commitment proceedings necessitates a hearing on probable cause
and a full hearing on the merits. The purpose of the preliminary
probable cause hearing is to determine the propriety of detaining a
person several days for psychiatric observation and care. The purpose
of the full hearing is to determine whether the alleged mentally ill
person should be hospitalized indefinitely." 0 S
Two recent lower federal court cases have held that a hearing to
determine probable cause for detention is constitutionally required
within a reasonable time after an emergency commitment proce101. Id. at 388.
102. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1972); see also Mitchell v. W. T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S.Ct.
719 (1975).
103. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
104. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971).
105. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1091-92 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (three-judge
court). See also Gerstein v. Pugh, 95 S.Ct. 854 (1975), in which the United States Supreme
Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause
as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following a warrantless arrest.
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dure.1 06 In New Mexico prior to judicial commitment of the individual for observation a judge must find that the person is "suffering
from a mental illness and that he is likely to injure himself or others
because of such illness unless provided with appropriate care and
custody."'0 The hearing procedure must be initiated within five
days after the patient is admitted to a hospital or mental health
facility or the patient must be released.' 0 8 The statute also requires
that a doctor be appointed who will make an examination of the
individual "as soon as practicable."' 9 The statute further requires
that the full hearing on the merits be held between five and 15 days
after receipt of the doctor's report.' '
The statute which governs the emergency commitment procedure
fails to set a time limit other than "as soon as practicable" for
appointment of the examining physician. There is no time limitation
within which the medical report must be filed. There is also no
statutory maximum number of days during which an individual may
be confined in the state hospital prior to a full hearing.
The statute alone cannot be taken at face value, since the
emergency commitment procedure actually followed does not provide a speedy hearing for the alleged mentally ill person.'' '. The fact
that the statute requires commencement of proceedings for a hearing
within five days of incarceration is deceiving. In practice, the hearing
is usually held six to eight weeks after the individual is institutionalized.' 12

Recent decisions support the proposition that statutory procedures which permit much time to pass before a full hearing are
invalid. In Bell v. Wayne County General Hospital a three-judge
federal court held that temporary detention for a maximum of 120
106. In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (three-judge court). In Lessard, the Court based the right to a
meaningful hearing upon the language in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971):
an individual must "be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any
significant property interest .. " The Lessard court said:
The individual's interest in liberty is even more compelling than his interest in
property rights: it follows that no significant deprivation of liberty can be
justified without a prior hearing on the necessity of the detention.
Id. at 1091.
107. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-18D (Supp. 1975).
108. Id. § 34-2-18F. The statute provides for the indirect action of the head of the
hospital or admitting physician in commencing commitment proceedings by the language
"cause to be commenced;" it is not clear what these words mean.
109. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-18C (Supp. 1975).
110. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-5E (Supp. 1975).
111. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-5F (Supp. 1975).
112. Stipulation of Facts at 5A, Thompson v. Hensley, Civil No. 74-279 (D.N.M., filed
May 30, 1974); Stipulation filed on Jan. 28, 1975).
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days without a hearing was an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty
without due process.' ' 3 The court held that the Fourteenth Amendment demands a prompt preliminary probable cause hearing within
five days and a full hearing, if probable cause exists, within a reasonable time.' ' ' In Lynch v. Baxley' I the court found the Alabama

face,' 16
emergency commitment statute unconstitutional on its
partly because the statute permitted apprehension of a person without limit on the time he could be held prior to being brought before
a judge. In Lynch the court concluded:
[W] here a person said to be mentally ill and dangerous is involuntarily detained, he must be given a hearing within a reasonable time
to test whether the detention is based upon probable cause to
believe that confinement is1 necessary under constitutionally proper
standards for commitment. 17
The court in Lessard invalidated a provision permitting incarceration

without a hearing for five days.' '
Lessard, Bell, and Lynch all require judicial review or approval of
extension of time prior to a hearing.' ' In Bell and in Lessard the

statutes under review set a definite time period during which a hearing on probable cause had to be held; the New Mexico statute does
not provide for judicial review of detention pending a full hearing,

nor does it set a specific time limit within which a hearing must be
held. It sets only a time limit for the "commencement" of proceedings.' 2 0
In the recent case of Thompson v. Hensley' 21 the New Mexico

emergency commitment statute and the procedures involved were
113. 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (three-judge court). The Bell court based its
holding upon Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (three-judge court)
and upon In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The court quoted from the
Barnard opinion:
[W] here a person, said to be mentally ill and dangerous, is involuntarily
detained, he must be given a hearing within a reasonable time to test whether
the confinement is based upon probable cause.... When personal freedom is
at issue due process at least demands that a person's legal status be determined
at the earliest possible time.
455 F.2d at 1374-75.
114. 384 F. Supp. at 1098.
115. 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (three-judge court).
116. Id. at 387.
117. Id. at 388.
118. 349 F. Supp. at 1090.
119. See Memorandum Brief in Support of Permanent Injunction for Plaintiff at 7,
Thompson v. Hensley, Civil No. 74-279 (D. N.M., Dec. 23, 1975); Brief filed on Jan. 28,
1975.
120. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-18F (Supp. 1975).
121. Civil No. 74-279 (D. N.M., Dec. 23, 1975).
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challenged before a three-judge federal court in Albuquerque. The
plaintiff alleged violation of his constitutional rights by the district
attorney of his county, the admitting physician, and the hospital
staff of Las Vegas State Hospital.' 22 The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that § 34-2-18, N.M.S.A., is unconstitutional for
several reasons: 1) lack of notice to the proposed patient and lack of
a preliminary hearing on probable cause; 2) lack of judicial review of
the emergency detention; 3) transportation and incarceration in a
mental institution far from the person's residence prior to a full
hearing; 4) lack of any time limit within which a full hearing must be
held; 5) vague and overbroad criteria for mental illness and dangerousness to self or to others; and 6) procedural inadequacies of the
subsequent full hearing held at the Las Vegas State Hospital."23
Thompson alleged that as of March 25, 1974, one person had been
confined in the Las Vegas State Hospital for five and a half years;
four for two and a half years; and 33 persons for up to 18 months
pursuant to emergency commitment procedures without a hearing.' 24 On December 23, 1975, the three-judge court rendered its
opinion in the case.' 12 Over one dissent, the court found the statute
met the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 26

Despite this holding, the state's imposing such serious deprivation
of individual liberty without ever having presented to a neutral
magistrate facts which show that the deprivation is substantially
authorized seems clearly to contravene the language and the purpose
of the due process clause, and is inconsistent with the decisions of
other federal courts. Statutory provisions limiting the time during
which a person can be committed without judicial authorization are
required.
Presence of the ProposedPatient at the Hearing
Under the New Mexico statute, the proposed patient "shall not be
required to be present" at the civil commitment hearing. 2 7 However, the court in Lynch v. Baxley' 28 held that due process requires
122. See Second Amended Complaint, Thompson v. Hensley, Civil No. 74-279 (D. N.M.,
Dec. 23, 1975).
123. Id.
124. Stipulation of Facts at SA, Thompson v. Hensley, Civil No. 74-279 (D. N.M., Dec.
23, 1975); Stipulation filed on Jan. 28, 1975.
125. Thompson v. Hensley, Civil No. 74-279 (D. N.M., Dec. 23, 1975); Motion to
Amend filed Jan. 5, 1975.
126. Memorandum Opinion at 3, Thompson v. Hensley, Civil No. 74-279 (D. N.M., Dec.
23, 1975).
127. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-5F (Supp. 1975).
128. 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974 (three-judge court).
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the presence of the person proposed to be involuntarily committed
at all judicial proceedings conducted for that purpose unless the right
to be present has been knowingly and intelligently waived by such
person or by his "adversary" counsel.' 2 9 Such a waiver is valid only
upon acceptance by the court following a judicial determination that
the person understands the nature of the right and is competent to
waive it. The court must determine that the proposed patient is so
mentally and physically ill as to be incapable of attending the civil
commitment proceedings. The Lynch court also said that the right to
participate at the hearing "to the extent of the subject's ability"' ' 0
precludes administering excessive or inappropriate medications to the
proposed patient immediately preceding the hearing.' 3'
The presence of the person at the hearing is closely related to the
opportunity to be heard. The proposed patient has an interest in
being present to confront witnesses testifying against him, a right
afforded criminal defendants by the Sixth Amendment. The individual's presence at both the preliminary hearing and the hearing on the
merits may be helpful. The individual will be assured that her interests are being protected, and presence at the hearing will give the
trier of fact an opportunity to speak to the individual and observe
her manner and behavior.' 3 2 If the psychiatric reports are conclusory in nature or framed in medical terms unrelated to the statutory
commitment standards, the factfinder can compare his own observations of the proposed patient who is present with those of the examining doctor." 3
New Mexico's permitting absence of the proposed patient demonstrates an a priori assumption of mental illness,' ' ' making "railroading" persons into mental institutions more likely. Presence of the
person is essential to reduce the danger of commitment of persons
who do not meet commitment standards and who have no other
opportunity to defend themselves.
Right to Counsel
The New Mexico statute for nonemergency commitment requires
that every proposed patient be given an opportunity to be represented by counsel and that the court appoint an attorney if none has
129. Id. at 388-90.
130. Id. at 389.
131. Id. Seealso Developments in the Law, supra note 22, at 1282, n. 111.
132. See Developments in the Law, supra note 22, at 1282-83. One court has held that
failure to allow the proposed patient to be present at the hearing violates due process. See
State ex reL Hawks v. Lazaro,,202 S.E.2d 109, 125 (W.Va. 1974).
133. Developments in the Law, supra note 22, at 1282-83.
134. E. Hannemann, supra note 3, at 31.
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been retained.' 1 3 Under the emergency commitment procedure, the
right to counsel is also provided in the judicial proceeding which is
held after the proposed patient is confined in the hospital or mental
health facility. 1 36 However, New Mexico statutes covering both
emergency and nonemergency commitment do not establish the right
of the alleged mentally ill person to notice of his right to counsel at
the outset of the commitment process.
The court in Bell extended the right to counsel to every step of
the commitment proceedings and held that a person must also be
notified of this right at the outset of the proceedings. 3 Under the
Lynch rule the proposed patient is entitled to counsel at all "significant stages" of the commitment process, which include all judicial
proceedings and "any other official proceedings at which a decision
is, or can be, made which may result in a detrimental change in the
conditions of the subject's liberty."' ' ' Lynch does not require that
right to counsel in Alabama extend to preliminary information
gathering stages of any proceeding, but the patient must be advised
of the right to counsel and to appointment of counsel if indigent.
The court specified that counsel must be made available to the proposed patient far enough in advance of the final commitment hearing
so that there is sufficient time for preparation. Before the final
commitment hearing, the names of the examining physicians and all
other witnesses testifying in support of the petition to commit must
be made available to counsel for the proposed patient. He or his
attorney must also be afforded a reasonable opportunity to inspect
any documents and records pertaining to the case.' '9 The court also
held that appointment of a guardian ad litem for the subject of an
involuntary civil commitment proceeding satisfies the constitutional
right to counsel only if the guardian is a licensed attorney and
occupies a "truly adversary position."' 40
To demonstrate the need for such right to counsel rules, it is
perhaps best to introduce observations and findings of commitment
hearings as conducted in Bernalillo County District Court.
Case Study of Bernalillo County DistrictCourt
Civil and criminal commitment hearings were observed in the
district court of Bernalillo County from September 1973 to March
135. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-18B (Supp. 1975).
136. § 34-2-18F states that proceedings for judicial determination must be commenced
pursuant to section 34-2-5 NMSA (1953).
137. 384 F. Supp. at 1093.
138. 386 F. Supp. at 389;Id. at n. 5.
139. Id. at 389.
140. Id.
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1974, a seven-month period. Most district court judges welcomed
research in this area and granted lengthy interviews, although one
did not allow any research in his courtroom. Access to court files to
obtain a more thorough and accurate sample was requested. However, access was denied on the ground of confidentiality, an unfortunate research limitation. Data had to be gathered by the
non-participant observation method, which resulted in a limited
working sample.
The majority of "insanity" hearings, as they are anachronistically
called, were held in a formal public courtroom,1 41 although some
were held in the judge's private chamber. Judges were assigned on a
rotating basis to hear the cases. Almost all proposed patients were
indigents represented by court appointed counsel.'42 Court
appointed attorneys are chosen by the district attorney's office. At
the time of the study lawyers donated their time for these hearings.
A rule since adopted provides that appointed counsel for civil commitment hearings now receive $60 per case1 ' from the Bernalillo
County Commission Civil Insanity Fund. There can be little doubt
that the time for preparation of a defense is severely limited. Because
of late appointments and low payment for their work at the time of
the study, attorney involvement was usually minimal. It was not at
all unusual for counsel and client to meet for the first time shortly
before the commitment hearing started. Thus, counsel must have
obtained information from the physician or psychiatrist or from the
district attorney, and not from the proposed patient. Most attorneys
did not cross-examine the expert witness thoroughly. They asked a
few questions as to medical details, which served to emphasize their
own lack of medical and psychiatric expertise, or they belabored one
minor point, perhaps to legitimize their role as representative of the
proposed patient.
It should be noted that in this study the testifying expert witness
was either a psychologist, a doctor of general medicine or a psychiatrist. Whereas most state laws require that one or two psychiatrists make evaluations and testify, the New Mexico statutes state
that only one "licensed physician," or an "osteopath" is needed. 1 4
141. All civil commitment hearings are now held at the Bernalillo County Mental Health
Center. A special commissioner assigned by the district court conducts the hearings.
142. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-5F (Supp. 1975).
143. Interview with Helen Cordova, Secretary of District Attorney's Office, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Sept. 15, 1975.
144. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-IC (Supp. 1975). Licensed physician. A doctor of medicine
or osteopathy licensed under the laws of this state to practice medicine or a medical officer
of the government of the United States while in this state in the performance of his official
duties.
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During the course of this study it was common practice in Bernalillo
County District Court to have general practitioners testify as experts
in psychiatric cases.
In several hearings the expert witness was a psychologist, who
although perhaps capable, was not the "licensed physician" required
by the statute. Yet, his professional opinions and testimony admitted
into evidence became the basis for commitment. Following one
judge's refusal to accept a psychologist's testimony because it did not
conform to statutory requirements,'"
progressively more psychiatrists testified at commitment hearings. But it is incongruous that the
New Mexico statute allows a physician who took perhaps one course
in psychiatry in medical school to testify to a person's mental condition, while experienced psychologists with years of study are barred.
Over a period of seven months, 27 mental competence hearings
were observed at the Bernalillo County Courthouse. Of these, 11
were civil and 16 criminal. The data from the criminal hearings is not
relevant because the question was the defendant's competency to
stand trial, not whether he should be involuntarily committed to a
mental health facility. This is a very small sample for data analysis, of
course, and one cannot build a very compelling case from it; but the
hearings observed were almost the only ones conducted during the
period of the study and, in that sense, are virtually a universe. Despite the small size of the sample, some interesting tendencies appear
in the data.
Most other studies of commitment procedures in the literature
deal exclusively with civil cases, and for purposes of comparison with
other such studies, this discussion must be confined to civil cases,
making the sample even smaller. Of the 11 patients proposed for civil
commitment, 10 were committed. The other was referred for outpatient treatment with the provision that if he failed to participate
he would be arrested.
AVERAGE LENGTH OF HEARING
BY TYPE OF OUTCOME
Outcome

Civil commitment indefinite
Civil commitment 6 months
Release

No.

7
3
0

Average
(min.)

18.4
18.3

The working sample of 10 hearings resulted in seven civil commitments for an indefinite period of time, three commitments for a
145. Court hearing, Bernalillo County District Court, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Oct.
15, 1973.
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six months period, and a zero release rate. The average length of the
hearings was 18.4 minutes per case, with a range from 5 to 31
minutes. This average is very high when compared to other studies.
Miller and Schwartz 146 reported that the average length of hearings
in their study was 4.1 minutes, and some cases were completed in
less than two minutes. Scheff,' 4 1 who studied civil commitment
proceedings in a Midwestern state, observed 22 hearings in one court.
He calculated a mean time of 1.6 minutes per hearing. Wenger and
Fletcher,1 48 who researched the effect of legal counsel on the length
of hearings, found that the average length was 8.13 minutes but that
hearings at which counsel was present were twice as long (16.84
minutes) and those without legal counsel (6.15 minutes).
In Bernalillo County legal counsel was present at every commitment hearing, and the high average of 18.4 minutes per case suggests
a more thorough and concerned investigation than elsewhere. This is
misleading, for most of the hearing time is taken up by the testimony
of the expert witness, the court appointed psychiatrist. In contrast to
other states, where the average hearing length is considerably shorter
than that in Bernalillo County, a detailed and lengthy explanation by
the doctor is welcomed by everyone (except possibly the proposed
patient). Of course, a lengthy hearing is preferred to two-minute
ones, but the outcome is usually the same.
In all 10 cases covered by this study the psychiatrist's recommendations were accepted by the court. This alone indicates the
doctor's power in commitment hearings. One could easily argue that,
if the doctor's testimony determines the outcome of most hearings,
why then have a hearing at all? Why cloak medical opinions in a veil
of legality?
Hearings observed during this study certainly do not protect the
proposed patient's rights, nor were patients adequately represented
by counsel. The proposition that civil commitment hearings are
ritualistic, farcical and lacking in due process seems valid when the
zero release rate is considered. A zero release rate suggests that
counsel never "won" a case and that the court never overruled the
psychiatrist's recommendations.
To summarize, the findings suggest that civil commitment procedures are neither complete nor adversarial. Although the average
146. Miller & Schwartz, County Lunacy Commission Hearings: Some Observations of
Commitments to a State Hospital, 14 Social Problems 26, 32 (1966).
147. Scheff, Social Condition for Rationality: How Urban and Rural Courts Deal with
the Mentally Ill in Mental Illness and Social Processes 107-118 (1967).
148. Wenger & Fletcher, The Effect of Legal Counsel on Admissions to a State Mental
Hospital: A Confrontation of Professionals, 10 Journal of Health and Social Behavior 69
(1968).
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length of a hearing was 18.4 minutes, much higher than in other
studies, hearings were dominated by the expert witness' testimony,
which determined the outcome of court orders. The data suggest that
court appointed counsel do not adversarily represent proposed
patients, but perform primarily a ceremonial function. To call them
"roleless" attorneys seems appropriate.
Civil commitment proceedings are further characterized by mutual
expectations of perfunctory performance. No pressure for the alteration of role and function is exerted from the formal participantsthe judge, the attorney, the psychiatrist, or the proposed patient. All
hearing and
seem content to go through the empty ritual of the
9
resist any temptation to indulge in self-evaluation.' 4
The data also indicates that on the basis of this ritualistic legal
ceremony, people are effectively incarcerated. "Incarceration,
whether called hospitalization or by other euphemism, means depriving a person of liberty."' ' 0 As long as people are deprived of their
liberty on the basis of commitment hearings, implementation of
procedural safeguards seems an urgent necessity.
Role of Counsel
The role of counsel in civil commitment proceedings creates
ethical problems for the attorney. Attorneys and courts seldom
consider the hearing adversarial in nature.' I' Nonadversarial proceedings have traditionally been justified by the parens patriae
concept,, which casts the state in the role of parent protecting the
individual. The attorney for the proposed patient is placed in the
dilemma of choosing to act as an advocate for the client's freedom or
to maintain a more neutral stance as a protective guardian.' 52 Professor Cohen, discussing the role of counsel, has said:
Direct observation of commitment hearings and extensive interviews
with participating attorneys lead to the conclusion that unless the
proceeding is adversary in nature (and here that equates with a jury
trial), the attorney does not engage in any preparation and does not
effectively participate in the hearing. 153
The New Mexico statute does not define the role of counsel in
149. Senate Hearings, 1970, supra note 1, at 482.
150. J. Katz, J. Goldstein & A. Dershowitz, Psychoanalysis, Psychiatry and Law 563
(1967).
151. Note, supra note 69, at 617.
152. Id. at 616.
153. Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally 111, 44
Texas L. Rev. 424 (1966).
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civil commitment proceedings. The attorney in civil commitment
proceedings who often lacks, in this capacity, an adversarial role
model' s 4 and special expertise, usually accepts the medical expert's
testimony at face value.
Lawyers who succumb to claims of expertise fail to utilize and
develop the legal process as an instrument of change and as a mechanism to challenge those who from even the best motives seek to
deprive a person of his liberty.., and in exchange allow the
psychiatrist to determine difficult questions that have been assigned
for solution to the legal process.' 5
Ziskin in Coping with Psychiatric and Psychological Testimony"6
argues that the lawyer should always point out that a) psychiatry is
aii inexact science without established principles or theories; b) that
psychiatry is not medicine and has neither scientifically established
nor clearly defined mental diseases; and c) that psychiatric examinations are fraught with danger of distortion, bias, and inaccuracy in
the collection, perception, recollection and interpretation of the data
obtained. Ziskin says:
For lack of reasonable certainty in psychiatric evaluation and diagnosis, it must be concluded at the present time that psychiatric
diagnoses and evaluations are speculative and conjectural and, therefore, are inadmissible. The reliability and validity of psychiatric
diagnoses and evaluations have been demonstrated to be lower than
the reliability and validity of evlaluations based on the use of the
polygraph and the latter have consistently been held to be inadmissible.'

57

Civil commitment hearings can be greatly improved if attorneys realize their potential functions in these proceedings.' I 8
Cohen' ' 9 suggests these prehearing tasks for lawyers in civil
154.
The difficulty... is that the lawyer involved in a civil commitment case has
no tradition to rely upon, develops no experience in this area because of a
limited number of appearances, has little in his professional training to prepare
him for this role, and has no source to consult for guidance; also, the county
judge is unlikely to require any more than a perfunctory performance. Without direction from the statute he must turn elsewhere for guidance-and his
search will be futile.
Id. at 441.
155. Id. at 450,
156. Ziskin, supra note 41, at 297-300.
157. Id. at 299-300.
158. See O'Neill, A Practical Guide for Attorneys Appointed as Guardians Ad Litem in
Civil Mental Health Commitment Proceedings,Hearings before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 257, 269 (1963).
159. Cohen, supra note 153, at 452-55.
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commitment proceedings: Study the records; communicate with the
proposed patient, family, friends; consult with the hospital staff,
physician, social worker; investigate facts; require a full medicalsocial report in the nature of a pre-sentence report used in criminal
proceedings; prior to the hearing explore the treatment plan' 6 0 and
custodial resources; explore various services offered in the community; attempt to explain to the client the legal consequences of a
commitment; insist that the physician use language that is understandable and provide reasons for the decisions; question the physician on whether the danger is to self or others and the degree, type,
and likelihood of such danger. In the litigation itself, counsel should
seek to ensure that statutory procedures and time limitations have

been met.'

6 1

Counsel should vigorously cross examine the testifying physician
and present testimony of relatives, friends or other physicians which
will support the person's claim to retain his liberty. Finally, appeal
should be taken upon the client's informed request.
lawyer becomes a mediator between the socio-medical model
and the legal mode. He can and should perform the function lawyers
often perform in this mediational role: Interpret specialized information to the client and other participants; advocate and negotiate on
behalf of the client; clarify, anticipate, and communicate effects of
alternative courses of action; and design and clarify policy. If the
attorney fails to perform these62functions, in all likelihood they will
not be performed by anyone.'
...the

It is necessary that both the courts and the bar of New Mexico
better understand and define the role of counsel in the commitment
process. Provisions should be made to reimburse counsel on an
hourly basis, including time for preparation of a case, or, as
Cohen' 6 3 suggests, attorneys should be required to file a detailed
160. "'.
. . Recent surveys in some states show that about two thirds of the state hospital
patients are there only because alternatives apparently were not available ... another study
shows that more than fifty per cent of the state hospital patients are not under active
treatment." Cohen, supra note 153, at 454.
161. Recall that a full hearing must be had no less than five days and no more than 15
days after the petition is filed, and § 34-2-5E makes no provision for an extension of time.
162. Cohen, supra note 153, at 455. See also Ziskin, Coping with Psychiatric and Psychological Testimony (1970); and suggestions by B. Ennis & L. Siegel in An American Civil
Liberties Union Handbook: The Rights of Mental Patients (1973), especially "Trial Techniques" at 283-97.
163. Cohen, supra note 153, at 458. See also ABA, Standards Relating to the Defense
Function § 3.3(a); ef Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the
Administration of Federal Criminal Justice 41-42 (1963); see also ABA, Juvenile Justice
Standards Project, Standards Relating to the Role of Counsel for Private Parties (L. Teitelbaum, Tent. Draft 1976) § 2.1(b):
(1) Lawyers participating in juvenile court matters, whether retained or
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report with the court for each case that would serve as the basis for
determination of the appropriate fee. Counsel's fee should be based
on actual involvement, and the concept of a standard fee should be
abandoned. Provisions should be made for appointing an independent psychiatrist at state expense in order to balance medical testimony by the state.
OTHER PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN CIVIL COMMITMENT
PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination
The Fifth Amendment says that no person "shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be witness against himself.""'64 The accused
may remain silent from the time of arrest to the end of trial. Recently, some courts have extended the privilege against self-ihcrimination to the proposed mental patient, whose statements to
psychiatrists and other mental health staff can be used against him as
part of the basis for commitment. 1 65 In the psychiatric interview,
the proposed patient is asked questions which may subsequently be
used by the examining physician as evidence that the person is
mentally ill and dangerous to others or to self, or in need of care and
treatment.
Under due process analysis the interests of the individual protected by the privilege against self-incrimination must be weighed
against the costs to the state if the privilege is granted. The most
important function which a right to remain silent would serve in civil
commitment would be to protect the individual's privacy. 1 6 6 If the
privilege is allowed, the state will have more difficulty in meeting its
burden of proof. The exercise of the privilege thwarts the state's
ability to determine the proposed patient's mental state by means of
appointed, are entitled to reasonable compensation for time and services
performed according to prevailing professional standards. In determining a
fee for his services, the lawyer should take into account the time and labor
actually required, the skill required to perform the legal service properly,
the likelihood (if apparent to the client) that acceptance of the case will
preclude other employment for the lawyer, the fee customarily charged in
the locality for similar legal services, the possible consequences of the
proceedings, and the experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or
lawyers performing the services....
164. U.S. Constitution, amend. V.
165. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1100-02 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (three-judge
court). Such application has been proposed under two theories: 1) civil commitment is a
"criminal case" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause,
which is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 2) the privilege is an element of due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Developments in the Law, supra note 22, at 1303-12.
166. For examples of psychiatric probing into unquestionably private matters, see
Lacovara, Workshop Session on Mental Illness, 37 F.R.D. 143 (1967).
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psychiatric interviews and testing which appear essential to deducing
necessary evidence.' 6 7
Lessard v. Schmidt addressed the question of whether an individual has the right to remain silent during the psychiatric interview.' 618
The court, applying the due process clause, weighed, on one hand,
the deprivation of liberty resulting from civil commitment 1 6 9 and,
on the other, the need for treatment or confinement which might be
foregone if the privilege against self-incrimination were invoked.' 70
The court concluded that a person may not be committed on the
basis of evidence obtained from the examination by the psychiatrist
unless the patient is informed of the right to refuse to answer the
psychiatrist's questions.' 71
The prevailing view is that the privilege against self-incrimination
should not be extended to psychiatric examinations made in the
course of civil commitment proceedings.' 7 2 Notifying proposed
patients of a privilege not to cooperate with psychiatrists would
undermine the state's attempt to obtain the most reliable evidence of
whether a person has a mental state requisite to warrant commitment.
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination could be
read as limited to individuals who risk revealing participating in
criminal acts.' 7
However, In re Gault,'
which extended the
privilege to respondents in juvenile court proceedings, emphasized
the nature of the particular statements and the result of the proceedings rather than the civil/criminal distinction. The Court said:
Commitment is a deprivation-of liberty. It is incarceration against
one's will, whether it is called "criminal" or "civil." And our Constitution guarantees that no person shall be "compelled" to be a
witness against himself when he is threatened with the deprivation of
his liberty.... 175
167. Developments in the Law, supra note 22, at 1310-12.
168. 349 F. Supp. at 1100-102.
169. Id. at 1100-101.
170. Id. at 1101.
171. Id. In Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp., 378, 394 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (three-judge
court), the three-judge court held that the privilege against self-incrimination is applicable at
all stages of a civil commitment proceeding, but protects only disclosures which might be
used as evidence or to obtain evidence in criminal prosecutions.
172. Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed sub nom;
Muriel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972) (The court refused to apply
the privilege against self-incrimination to psychiatrict examinations of alleged mentally defective delinquents). See Developments in the Law, supra note 22, at 1303-12.
173. The Fifth Amendment says that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be witness against himself."
174. 387 U.S. 1, 47-57 (1967).
175. Id. at 49, 50.
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It is argued from Gault that the privilege against self-incrimination
should apply to any "civil" proceeding which involves a substantial
curtailment of liberty. 1 76 However, Gault involved conduct which,
if committed by an adult, would have been criminal, the factor
which seems the unifying element in Supreme Court decisions on the
matter.
The Lessard court may have wrongly concluded that the individual's interests outweigh those of the state. 1 7 1 Since psychiatric
examination is an essential to the state's case, prevention of an
examination to determine a proposed patient's mental condition
would unduly thwart legitimate interests of the state- confinement
of persons who are dangerous to others and treatment of those who
cannot care for themselves.
Standard of Proof
The standard of proof required for involuntary commitment is
closely related to the finding of mental illness and dangerousness
necessary to justify an order for compulsory hospitalization. Because
"mental illness" and "dangerousness" are elusive concepts, entailing
a high risk of error, in order to prevent erroneous commitment a
standard of proof higher than mere preponderance of the evidence
should be required.
Until September 5, 1975, New Mexico applied the preponderance
standard for civil commitment determination. Then, the Supreme
Court of New Mexico in State v. Valdez, 178 as have other
courts,1 79 adopted the standard of clear and convincing evidence for
civil commitment proceedings. The Court said:
...In the civil commitment situation the interests of the State are
pitted against restriction on the liberty of the individual. The specific question which needs to be answered is whether there exists
sufficient State interests to counterbalance the loss of individual
liberty and justify the application of the particular burden of proof.
Based on the language of § 34-2-5, supra, it appears that the aim of
176. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1101-102 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (three-judge
court). Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion in McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution,
407 U.S. 245, 257 (1972), stated on the basis of Gault, that the defendant should be able to
use the privilege during the psychiatric examination because of the potential loss of liberty
involved.
177. See Developments in the Law, supra note 22, at 1312.
N.M.
,540 P.2d 818 (1975).
178. State v. Valdez,
179. Dixon v. Attorney Gen. of Pennsylvania, 325 F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1971)
(three-judge court); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 393 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (three-judge
court); see also Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 276, 285
(1966). Woodby involved a deportation proceeding in which the United States Supreme
Court held the government to proof by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.
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the State is to first protect society from the mentally ill, a manifestation of the State's police power and also protect the mentally ill
from themselves, while at the same time providing care and treatment, as parens patriae.180
Noting that mental illness is not a crime, the Court noted that
patients must be afforded "some type of effective treatment since
their liberty is abridged; mere custodial care is not sufficient." '1 8
The Court concluded that the state's interests "are sufficient and the
realities of treatment, though not ideal, are adequate to justify subjecting individuals to possible commitment based on this new
standard of proof."' 82
The clear and convincing standard was preferred because psychology and psychiatry are inexact. The Court reasoned:
... Where there is sometimes disagreement as to the meaning of a
diagnosis of "mental illness," even among the disciplines concerned
with human behavior, it would seem that the highest standard of
proof would be desirable, but at the same time the question arises
whether the reasonable doubt standard is workable within this particular framework. In the opinion of this court, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is too stringent a standard.' 83
Lessard v. Schmidt held that permitting indefinite commitment on
the basis of a preponderance of the evidence that a person is
mentally ill and dangerous to himself or others was violative of due
process.' 84 The Lessard court held the state to the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt all facts necessary to show that an
individual is mentally ill and dangerous. 1 8
Because of the deprivation both of liberty and basic civil rights as well as the stigma caused
by lack of confidentiality of the adjudication, the Lessard court
concluded that the highest standard must apply. The court compared
the interests at stake in a hearing to determine juvenile delinquency
and in a proceeding to determine civil commitment and found a
stronger need for a stringent standard of proof in civil commitment
proceedings than in juvenile delinquency proceedings: the juvenile
respondent forfeits no civil rights, and the proceedings are confidential. Yet the court in In re Winship, involving a juvenile delinquency
hearing, required proof beyond a reasonable doubt.' 8
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

State v. Valdez,
N.M.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 822-23.
349 F. Supp. at 1096.
Id.
Id. at 1095.

,540

P.2d 818, 822 (1975).
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In In re Ballay the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
similarly held that due process requires the standard of proof beyond
1
a reasonable doubt in civil commitment proceedings. 87 The court
compared the interests of the state and those of the individual in civil
commitment and in criminal proceedings. It found the interests of
the state less weighty in civil commitment cases than in criminal
cases, while individual deprivations resulting from the two proceedings are equivalent. The court concluded that the higher standard of
it
proof would not create undue administrative inconvenience while
18 8
would reduce the danger of erroneously committing a person.
The clear and convincing standard of proof has been proposed as a
compromise which gives the individual protection from an arbitrary
determination of his mental state without placing an impossible
burden of proof upon the state. 189 Others argue that to compensate
for the inexactitude of medical science, proof beyond a reasonable
doubt should be the standard for commitment. One attorney has
suggested that agreement between at least two testifying psychiatrists
or doctors should be required.' 90 By requiring corroborating expert
testimony a state's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt could
be met. If juries are required to decide the mental state of a criminal
defendant who raises the insanity defense, based upon proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, the standard should be workable in civil commitment proceedings, where the respondent's mental state is also at
issue."' ' The criminal standard should apply in a commitment
proceeding because the risk of error, the injury resulting from
stigmatization, and the deprivation of liberty are of 'the same
magnitude.' 92
Use of Hearsay Evidence
The courts in Lessard v. Schmidt and Lynch v. Baxley held that
the rules of evidence controlling testimony should apply to involuntary civil commitment proceedings.' ' ' In Lynch the court said that
hearsay evidence excluded from other proceedings should also be
excluded from commitment hearings.' 9
McCormick has defined hearsay evidence as:
187. 482 F.2d at 656, 669.
188. Id. at 667-69.
189. Note, supra note 69, at 634.
190. Interview with attorney Raymond Schowers in Albuquerque, New Mexico, Sept.
19, 1975.
191. Id.
192. Ennis & Siegel, supra note 37, at 34.
193. 349 F. Supp. at 1102-103; 386 F. Supp. at 393.
194. 386 F. Supp. at 394.
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testimony in court, or written evidence, of a statement made out of
court, the statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth
of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the
credibility of the out-of-court asserter.' 95
In determining whether to admit out-of-court statements, courts
should consider the purpose for which the evidence is being introduced and the hardship posed to the respondent if counsel is unable
to cross examine out-of-court declarants.
Hearsay problems in commitment hearings take several forms.
Out-of-court utterances of the proposed patient have traditionally
been regarded as evidence of irrational conduct, not as hearsay. 96
These statements are offered to show the mental state of the individual and not to prove the truth of the matter which the individual
assets. 9 ' Testimony of the examining physician to out-of-court
statements of a relative of the proposed patient, on the other hand,
presents good reasons for exclusion. There is the possibility that the
declarant either lied, lacked ability to observe, or remembered poorly
the proposed patient's statement, which he related to the testifying
physician. These are classic reasons for requiring that there be an
opportunity to cross examine the declarant.' 9 8
Medical or psychiatric reports offered as evidence, where the
person making the report is not present to testify during the hearing,
present the same problem, compounded by the ambiguity of many
psychiatric terms. Presence of the examining psychiatrist or doctor
would, enable the trier of fact to benefit from cross examination as to
the physician's ability to observe the proposed patient and the extent
to which his findings relate to commitment standards. Opportunity
to confront and cross examine should be afforded whenever it will
enhance the accuracy of fact finding.'
Hearsay exclusion seems
the most effective way of insuring that the opportunity exists.
195. McCormick, Evidence 584 (2d. ed. 1972); for a functional analysis of the hearsay
problem, see Tribe, TriangulatingHearsay, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 957 (1974).
196. Id. at 593.
197. Id. An example of such statement by a proposed patient is: "I am Henry the
Eighth." The statement is not being offered to show the truth of the statement, only that
the person believes he is Henry the Eighth and is suffering from a delusion.
198. See Note, supra note 69, at 625-26, which criticizes the Lessard case holding hearsay evidence inadmissible in involuntary civil commitment proceedings. The court based its
holding upon the Due Process Clause, not upon the Sixth Amendment right to confront
witnesses. The second basis has been emphasized by the United States Supreme Court. He
also comments that the scope of the hearsay rule was never defined in Lessard. It is unclear
whether the rule applies to statements made in court and to statements made by examining
physicians. Id. at 626.
199. See, e.g., Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 350-51 (1955); Willner v. Committee on
Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 104-05, 107-08 (1963).
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The Morrissey v. Brewer2 0 0 holding that hearsay in the form of
letters, affidavits and reports would be admissible in a parole revocation hearing, although such evidence could not be used in a criminal
trial, might suggest the opposite conclusion.2 0 In parole revocation
hearings, however, the hearsay evidence is offered to prove the
specific act or acts which violated the terms of parole. In such hearings the defendant himself can rebut this hearsay evidence which is
unfavorable to his position. In civil commitment hearings, out-ofcourt statements are offered to prove the broad concept of a mental
condition, not to prove the commission of a specific act. Counsel for
the proposed patient may face a dilemma: to allow the client to
testify to rebut the harmful effects of hearsay statements creates a
risk thatthe client may be so unable to present testimony in a clear
manner that the state's case will appear stronger.2 02 Moreover, no
practicable means appear for attacking a physician's out-of-court
statements or reports short of cross examination. Finally, the proposed patient's credibility, as an instrument of rebuttal, may be
significantly diminished by the action's having been brought at all.
Hearsay exclusion seems necessary to achieving factual accuracy in
commitment hearings.
The New Mexico civil commitment statute, by providing that "the
Court shall receive all relevant and material evidence which may be
offered and shall not be bound by the rules of evidence, "20 3 permits
use of hearsay evidence. Rules of evidence represent court's judgments that some evidence has too little, probative value to justify the
prejudice it engenders. The commitment process affects individual
interests important enough to require that considerable care be taken
in correctly determining facts. The conduct of the commitment hearing should be governed by the rules of evidence.
CONCLUSION
Extension of stringent procedural safeguards to persons who are
subject to involuntary civil commitment proceedings should be of
paramount concern to the New Mexico courts, legislature and bar.
The New Mexico civil commitment statutes should be revised to
require fuller notice in all cases and mandatory prompt probable
cause hearings in emergency commitment. Statutory vagueness
should be eliminated: terms such as "mental illness" and "dangerous200. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
201. Id. at 489.
202. See Note, supra note 69, at 626.
203. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-5 F (Supp. 1975).
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ness" need more precise definitions, explaining fully and in detail
what constitutes mental illness and dangerousness and the magnitude
and likelihood of both which justify involuntary hospitalization. The
panoply of substantive and procedural rights should be observed
both by statute and by vigorous representation by well-prepared
counsel.
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